

## A Question of Posture: Engaging the World with Justin Martyr, George Lindbeck and Hans Frei

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**Abstract:** This essay explores the posture adopted towards the world by one ancient and two contemporary Christian writers: Justin Martyr, George Lindbeck and Hans Frei. They respectively represent what are designated as defensive, receptive, and reciprocal postures, postures which determine the extent to which, and the manner in which, these writers appropriate insights and knowledge from beyond the Christian tradition. The theology and, to a lesser extent, the cultural background of each approach are studied. The particular doctrinal locus in question is Christology. An assessment is made of the link made by each author between the place of Jesus Christ in their theological framework and the posture which they adopt towards the rest of the world. Using the approaches of Justin and Lindbeck as a foil, Frei's idiosyncratic work will be shown to demonstrate that a high level of reciprocity between the church and the rest of the world is compatible with an orthodox Christology.

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY IS STILL getting used to its loss of a culturally-secure position from which it might remain indifferent to the truth claims made by, or the virtuous practices found in, other communities, traditions and disciplines. These include claims and practices which question the church's understanding, not only of the world, but also of itself. In this context what posture should theologians, and the church which they serve, adopt towards the rest of the world? How does the church engage with the rest of the world? In this study I want to outline three such postures, one drawn from antiquity, and two from contemporary theology. They are arbitrarily designated as *defensive*, *receptive* and *reciprocal*. The first two, represented by Justin Martyr and George Lindbeck respectively, more typically represent Christian theological strategies for engaging the world. The third, represented by Hans Frei, is more idiosyncratic, but potentially more fruitful than the first two. I will argue that Frei's highly nuanced ideas – to which I will devote a significant amount of exegesis – provide a strong theological basis for understanding how some of the church's own questions not only about the world as a whole, but also about itself and the gospel which called it

into being, might be answered through its own engagement with the world. The doctrinal locus at issue is Christology. In each case, I will examine the manner in which Christology determines the posture adopted towards the rest of the world. I will ultimately argue that Frei's work helps us to see that the reciprocal posture is not only theologically possible, but also intrinsic to an orthodox Christology. I will conclude the study by making a brief assessment of Frei's contribution to contemporary theological discussion.

## 1. THE DEFENSIVE POSTURE:<sup>1</sup> JUSTIN MARTYR'S *LOGOS SPERMATIKOS*

### 1.1 The Idea

The use of the Stoic idea of the *logos spermatikos* was by no means unique to Justin among the patristic apologists, although it is especially associated with him. It emerges, mostly on an *ad hoc* basis, in his first and second Apologies.<sup>2</sup> Essentially, it involves describing Christ not only as the whole *Logos*, the "whole rational principle (to; logico;n to; o{lon)"<sup>3</sup> but also as the Sower of the dispersed "seed of logos (spevrma tou' lovgou)"<sup>4</sup> which account for truth and wisdom before Christ.

And I confess that I both pray and with all my strength strive to be found a Christian; not because the teachings of Plato are different from those of Christ, but because they are not in every respect equal, as either are those of the others, Stoics and poets and historians. For each person spoke well, according to the part present in him of the divine logos, the Sower (ajpo; mevroui tou' spermatikou' qeivou lovgou), whenever he saw what was related to him.<sup>5</sup>

1. To describe Justin's posture towards the world as "defensive" should not be taken to imply a merely reactive *defensiveness*. His posture might equally be thought of as "offensive" in the sense that he was pro-actively *on the offensive* in the context of Christianity's relationship with its opponents.

2. Quotations from these works are taken from St Justin Martyr, *The First and Second Apologies* (English translation by Leslie William Barnard; New York/Mahwah, NJ: Paulist, 1997). References will be in the form of 1A or 2A (representing the first and second Apology respectively) followed by the chapter number. Other translations consulted were: Pusey in *A Library of Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church Anterior to the Division of East and West* (London: Parker and Rivington, 1861); Dods, Reith and Pratten in *Ante-Nicene Christian Library* Vol II (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1867); and Falls in *The Fathers of the Church* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1948). Citations from the Greek text are taken from A. W. F. Blunt (ed.), *The Apologies of Justin Martyr* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911). My thanks to Dr Geoff Jenkins for his assistance in the checking of translations. Any errors remains my own responsibility.

3. 2A.10. This has also been translated as "whole rational being" (Dods et al., and Pusey) or simply "the whole logos" (Falls).

4. 2A.8. See the parallel expression in 1A.44: "And hence there seem to be seeds of truth among all people."

5. 2A.13. What is rendered here as "Sower" has also been translated as "Seminal Divine Word" (Falls, Pusey) and "spermatic word" (Dods et al.).

Thus Justin speaks of Christ as “the logos of whom every race of men and women were partakers (metevsce)”<sup>6</sup> and he adjudges Socrates and Plato, among others, to be Christians before Christ:

And they who lived with the logos are Christians, even though they have been thought atheists; as among the Greeks, Socrates and Heraclitus, and people like them; and among the barbarians, Abraham, and Ananias...and many others whose actions and names we now decline to recount...<sup>7</sup>

This thought is rendered even more explicit in the claim that Socrates, though definitely inferior to Christ, was nevertheless to be regarded as himself having known Christ, albeit in part:

For no one trusted in Socrates.... But in Christ, who was partially known even by Socrates [for He was and is the logos who is in every person (logoi gar h\ n kai; e[stin oJ ejn panti; w[n), and who foretold the things that were to come to pass both through the prophets, and in His own person, when He had assumed our nature, and taught these things], not only philosophers and scholars believed, but also artisans and people entirely uneducated....<sup>8</sup>

Thus, the idea of distinguishing between, on the one hand, Christ as the *logos* and, on the other hand, the dispersed *seed of logos* enabled Justin to address more than one audience. It meant he could speak to Jewish understandings of the divine word in the sayings of the prophets; it also allowed him to speak to philosophers who sought reason in preference to popular polytheism. They have in common that they have lived only with a partial knowledge of the logos. In contrast, Christians are said to be those who live “not by a part only from logos, the Sower (ouj kata; spermatikou' loggou mevroi), but by the knowledge and contemplation of the whole logos, who is Christ (ajlla; kata; th;n tou' panto;1 loggou, o{ ejsti Cristou', gnw'sin kai; qewrivan)”.<sup>9</sup> Justin reinforces this contrast when he compares the respective abilities of Christian and non-Christian to speak coherently of what they know. Because “lawgivers and philosophers” who came before Christ “did not know all that concerns logos, who is Christ, they often contradicted themselves”.<sup>10</sup> Christians, in contrast, can claim to be in possession of an “irrefutable knowledge”.<sup>11</sup> “Therefore,” he continues, “whatever things were rightly said among all people are the property of us Christians.”<sup>12</sup>

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6. 1A.46

7. 1A.46

8. 2A.10

9. 2A.8

10. 2A.10. See also 2A.13 and 1A.44.

11. 2A.13

12. 2A.13

Justin's defensive posture does not, therefore, by any means entail a refusal to acknowledge truth before and beyond Christianity. Clearly, he is making various connections between the church and the world. For my purposes, however, the critical question is, "What status does it actually give to the truth so acknowledged?" Upon the answer to this question depends a large part of the assessment of how Justin reads the world in Christ. At issue is the nature of the relationship between Christ, *to; logico;n to; o{lon* and the *spevrma tou' lovgou* which account for the insights and truths voiced by those who were before Christ.

### 1.2 Continuity or Discontinuity?

Is the *spevrma tou' lovgou* continuous with *to; logico;n to; o{lon*? Or, is it categorically distinct from it? To answer this it is necessary, without delaying the argument too much, to tread carefully because Justin has been interpreted variously on just this point.

Ragnar Holte, for instance, has suggested that the *logos spermatikos* refers to something divine, whereas the *seed of logos* to something human.<sup>13</sup> If this is the case, then Justin's engagement with the world would seem to be invested with less theological significance than would otherwise be the case. The need to uphold this divine/human contrast appears to be related to an attempt to protect the absolute in favour of the relative supremacy of Christ.<sup>14</sup> Underlying the argument is an appeal to the Stoic antecedents of the idea of *logos spermatikos* and the claim that those antecedents never entertained the idea of continuity between the logos and its seeds. It is claimed that according to this tradition, "the 'seeds' are not strictly identical with the Spermatic Logos, but are instead products of its activity".<sup>15</sup> Some basis for this interpretation is found in a distinction which Justin himself draws: "For the seed and imitation of something, imparted according to capacity, is one thing, an another is the thing itself..."<sup>16</sup> As Eric Osborn points out, however, where this interpretation breaks down is in its underestimation of the impact of Platonic ideas of participation which, in Justin's hands, give contours to the *logos spermatikos* idea which it never had when fashioned by purely Stoic concepts. It is particularly clear in the Justin's comment, already quoted above, that "every race of men and women were partakers (*metevsce*)" of the logos.<sup>17</sup> With the incorporation of the participation doctrine into this theory, the need for a sharp and absolute contrast is removed. "Whatever truth or reality a

13. Ragnar Holte, "Logos Spermatikos: Christianity and Ancient Philosophy According to St Justin's Apologies", *Studia Theologica* 12 (1958) 109-68.

14. Holte, "Logos Spermatikos", 141.

15. Holte, "Logos Spermatikos", 137.

16. 2A.13.

17. See 1A.46

copy has, it derives from that in which it participates. In so far as it is, it is the same as the reality."<sup>18</sup> It is a doctrine which "allows for degree of truth and reality", and, therefore, of continuity.<sup>19</sup>

Having clarified this point, it is possible to return to the question posed above concerning the relationship between Christ, *to; logico;n to; o{lon*, and the truth of the *spevrma tou' lovgou*. The measured continuity that exists between them involves the investment of a high degree of theological significance in the seeds of logos. The distinction between them and Christ is not categorical. Justin, it might thus be said, reads the world strongly in Christ, allowing him to establish a strong connection between church and the rest of the world. Nevertheless, the defensive posture of this engagement involves him rendering the truth of the dispersed seed as superseded and quite redundant to Christians, who, as indicated above, are said to possess an "irrefutable knowledge" and have been relieved of the danger of contradicting themselves. If there was any room for receptivity to the insights of philosophers, prophets and poets – which were, after all, "the property of us Christians" – it was a dominating rather than an open and inviting receptivity. Speaking for the Christians, Justin writes: "It is not, then, that we hold the same opinions as others, but that all speak in imitation of ours."<sup>20</sup>

### 1.3 Summary and Questions

For a community whose very existence and nascent intellectual claims were literally under siege, Justin's apologetic strategy was nothing short of brilliant. Fighting on various fronts, he developed a theory which not only fortified those fronts simultaneously, but which also gave the church a theory of the coherence of various truth claims which was grounded in the universality of the Logos, Christ. To put it bluntly, those who know Christ know it all. Nevertheless, in the present era, alerted to the imperialistic possibilities of such an approach, it is

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18. Eric Osborn, *Justin Martyr* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1973) 142. See also Osborn's "Justin Martyr and the Logos Spermatikos", *Studia Missionalia* 42 (1993) 157-58. Also rejecting Ragnar's interpretation is Barnard, *St. Justin Martyr: The First and Second Apologies*, 196-200 n. 71. (Indeed, Barnard argues that the measure of Justin's originality is such – not least in his identification of the whole logos with Christ – that Stoic antecedents should not be allowed to condition too rigidly the interpretation of the *logos spermatikos* idea.) Henry Chadwick is another who, in his "Justin's Defence of Christianity", *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 47 (1965) 275-95, argues against discontinuity. Specifically qualifying Holte's work, Chadwick claims that Justin presented Christ as "the one who brings potentiality to actuality" (295). See too Chadwick's "The Beginning of Christian Philosophy: Justin: The Gnostics", in A. H. Armstrong (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967) 61, where he draws attention to the continuity between Platonism and Christianity implied by Justin's account of his conversion.

19. Eric Osborn, "Word, Spirit and Geistmetaphysik", *Prudentia Supplement* (1985) 65.

20. 1A.60.

necessary to ask whether such a strongly christological engagement with the world must necessarily be linked to such a defensive posture. Could it not also warrant a more receptive posture? To pursue this I now move forward some seventeen centuries to the work of the contemporary American theologian, George Lindbeck.

## 2. THE RECEPTIVE POSTURE: GEORGE LINDBECK'S "ABSORBING THE WORLD"

### 2.1 The Idea

The notion of "absorbing the world" is Lindbeck's metaphor for the broad parameters of the manner in which he proposes the church relates to the rest of the world. The details of this proposal are inseparable from Lindbeck's broader strategy, set out in his *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age*,<sup>21</sup> of describing religions as "cultural-linguistic systems" and his commitment to the "intratextual" character of the theology which is appropriate to Christianity when understood as such a system. In summary: "Intratextual theology redescribes reality within the scriptural framework rather than translating Scripture into extrascriptural categories. It is the text, so to speak, which absorbs the world, rather than the world the text."<sup>22</sup> In order, therefore, to understand the *receptivity* associated with this proposal for "absorbing the world" it will be necessary briefly to explore the wider network of ideas which it inhabits.

This understanding of religions as cultural-linguistic systems is offered as an alternative to models of religions which Lindbeck respectively designates as "cognitivist" and "experiential-expressivist". Within the cognitivist approach, Lindbeck includes those theories of religion which emphasise "the ways in which church doctrines function as informative propositions or truth claims about objective realities".<sup>23</sup> The experiential-expressive approach, on the other hand, is built upon the conviction that the religions are "products of those deep experiences of the divine (or the self, or the world) which most of us are accustomed to thinking of as peculiarly religious".<sup>24</sup> On this basis, different religions are understood as "diverse expressions or objectifications of a common core experience".<sup>25</sup>

At this point it is essential to note that it is not the inadequacies *per se* of the cognitivist and experiential-expressivist models which lead Lind-

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21. George A. Lindbeck, *The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984)

22. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 118.

23. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 16.

24. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 30.

25. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 31. This particular phraseology Lindbeck takes from Bernard Lonergan's *Method in Theology* (Herder and Herder, 1972) 101-24.

beck to reject them. Instead, Lindbeck's presenting problem is a specifically Christian theological issue: the confusion about the status of doctrine itself among Christian churches involved in ecumenical conversations, a confusion which is said to be more basic than the debates about specific doctrines.<sup>26</sup> The details of Lindbeck's own view of doctrine are not at issue in this paper.<sup>27</sup> What is at issue is the way in which the cultural-linguistic model emerges from a "pretheological inquiry"<sup>28</sup> into a theological problem and the fact that this model involves Lindbeck in giving an account of the way the church relates to the rest of the world.

The cultural-linguistic model of a religion involves inverting the relationship between experience and religion assumed by the experiential-expressivist model. Rather than understand religions as diverse refractions of universal, even innate, experiences, he proposes that they should be understood as themselves "producers of experience".<sup>29</sup> "Stated more technically," he writes,

a religion can be viewed as a kind of cultural and/or linguistic framework or medium that shapes the entirety of life and thought. It functions somewhat like a Kantian *a priori*, although in this case the *a priori* is a set of acquired skills that could be different. It is not primarily an array of beliefs about the true and the good (although it may involve these), or a symbolism expressive of basic attitudes, feelings, or sentiments (although these will be generated). Rather, it is similar to an idiom that makes possible the description of realities, the formulation of beliefs, and the experiencing of inner attitudes, feelings and sentiments.<sup>30</sup>

So, how does Christianity, so construed, engage with the rest of the world? How does it *receive* what the world might offer? What is at stake in Christian theology "absorbing the world"? There are two issues addressed by Lindbeck which provide insights into answers to these questions. The first is the character of theology accommodated by this model. The second is the relationships between the various religions when they are all construed as cultural-linguistic systems.

## 2.2 The Task of Theology

Lindbeck argues that the task of Christian theology, as a discipline within the Christian cultural-linguistic system, is not to appeal to

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26. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 7f.

27. Suffice to say that the solution Lindbeck offers to this problem is to understand church doctrines as neither unchanging propositions nor as divergent theories of a shared experience, but as the grammar of the religion (see *Nature of Doctrine*, 73-90).

28. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 30.

29. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 31.

30. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 33.

universal – or extratextual – criteria to justify its claims about reality. Rather its business is intratextual: "...the proper way to determine what "God" signifies...is by examining how the word operates *within* a religion and thereby shapes reality and experience rather than by first establishing its propositional or experiential meaning..."<sup>31</sup> So, theology is given a more descriptive rather than apologetic responsibility: its purpose is "to give a normative explication of the meaning a religion has for its adherents".<sup>32</sup> Yet, the scope of meaning is not just the religion itself. Rather, a community shaped by such a theology (which is, in turn, shaped by that community's authoritative texts) inhabits a "scriptural world" which is "able to absorb the universe. It supplies the interpretative framework within which believers seek to live their lives and understand reality."<sup>33</sup> So, "the text absorbs the world, rather than the world the text".

That is not to say, however, that such an approach removes theology from all apologetic enterprises, but that any such apologetics will be of an *ad hoc* nature.<sup>34</sup> Precisely because religions are typically "comprehensive interpretative schemes",<sup>35</sup> the whole world, indeed the universe, lies within their respective horizons. Any given religion can therefore cultivate a certain "aesthetic reasonableness"<sup>36</sup> based on its "assimilative powers,...its ability to provide an intelligible interpretation in its own terms of the varied situations and realities adherents encounter."<sup>37</sup> On this basis "[c]onfirmation or disconfirmation occurs through an accumulation of successes or failures in making practically and cognitively coherent sense of relevant data, and the process does not conclude... until the disappearance of the last communities of believers or, if the faith survives, until the end of history".<sup>38</sup>

With this theology and the associated task of *ad hoc* apologetics as the framework for the metaphor of "absorbing the world" it would appear that Lindbeck has not provided the more open and inviting receptivity that was lacking in Justin's defensive posture. Indeed, Lindbeck's receptivity has an almost ravenous quality to it: the world seems to be there simply to be absorbed for those who get to it first.

To put it bluntly, those who know Christ might yet not know it all, but by absorbing and assimilating they eventually will. This, however,

31. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 114 (my emphasis).

32. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 113.

33. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 117.

34. See Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 131. For a defence of this aspect of Lindbeck's proposal – and a more detailed exposition than is possible here – see Bruce D. Marshall, "Absorbing the World: Christianity and the Universe of Truths", in Marshall (ed.), *Theology and Dialogue: Essays in Conversation with George Lindbeck* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 69-102.

35. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 32.

36. See Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 130.

37. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 131.

38. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 131.

is not all that has to be said of Lindbeck's approach. It is, therefore, now necessary to attend to the second issue intimated above.

### 2.3 The Inter-religious Relationships

Lindbeck's discussion of the relationship between the different religions when each is construed as a cultural-linguistic system<sup>39</sup> is set against the general point acknowledged by Lindbeck, that it "is simplistic to say...merely that religions produce experiences, for the causality is reciprocal" and that "[p]atterns of experience alien to a given religion can profoundly influence it".<sup>40</sup> More specifically, this means that understanding the diverse religions as discrete cultural-linguistic systems, even with possibly "incommensurable notions of truth",<sup>41</sup> does not render dialogue between the religions pointless. The advantage of this model, especially *vis à vis* the experiential-expressivist model, is that the relationships between the religions are relieved of the burden of tedious comparisons based on a putatively common, shared experience. For instance, on this basis, Christians need not approach other religions as inferior or even merely alternative versions of what Christianity itself experiences. Acknowledging the uniqueness of the non-Christian religions renders it easier to acknowledge the possibility that something not already known to Christians might be learnt from them. Indeed, Lindbeck explicitly allows for the "unsubstitutable uniqueness of the God-willed missions of non-Christian religions".<sup>42</sup> They can be regarded as discrete cultural-linguistic systems "within which potentialities can be actualized and realities explored that are not within the direct purview of the people of Messianic witness, but that are nevertheless God-willed and God-approved anticipations of aspects of the coming kingdom."<sup>43</sup> Even the claim, consistent with the cultural-linguistic model, that Christianity is uniquely salvific, is not "at all the same as denying that other religions have resources for speaking truths and referring to realities, even highly important truths and realities, of which Christianity as yet knows nothing and by which it could be greatly enriched."<sup>44</sup> There is, therefore, a "process of learning [which]

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39. Lindbeck devotes a whole chapter of *Nature of Doctrine* (46-72) to this topic. It is a particularly dense treatment of a range of issues, only one of which I am taking up here. For a more complete critical discussion see Kenneth Surin, "'Many religions and the one true faith': an examination of Lindbeck's chapter 3" in Surin, *The Turnings of Darkness and Light: Essays in Philosophical and Systematic Theology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 159-79.

40. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 33.

41. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 49.

42. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 54.

43. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 54f.

44. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 61.

needs to be continued in reference to contemporary non-Christian religions and cultures."<sup>45</sup>

This would appear to be a move towards the kind of receptivity that was described at the outset and which was seen to be lacking in Justin. Might Lindbeck's position be expressed in these terms: those who know Christ are on the way to knowing all that is ultimately important to know, but there are also penultimate things to be learned from others along the way? Alas, closer examination reveals that there is a further move made by Lindbeck which undermines the theological coherence of the whole approach.

On the one hand, Lindbeck wants to allow that other communities have access – not given to Christians – to “truths and realities” which he says are “God-willed and God-approved anticipations of aspects of the coming of the kingdom”. This direct link with the coming kingdom would appear to signify a high degree of theological, even Christological, significance to these “truth and realities”. The clear suggestion is that there are things about Christ's kingdom not known to Christians – itself an uncontroversial suggestion – but which are, in fact, known to non-Christians – a somewhat more controversial and potentially highly fruitful suggestion. On the other hand, however, Lindbeck drives a wedge between these “truths and realities” which are said to be aspects of the coming kingdom and the grace of Christ. He argues that his cultural-linguistic model, emphasising difference between the religions, “is a sounder basis for dialogue than when one seeks to find the grace of Christ at work in non-Christian religions”. He continues with a defence of this approach: “The danger in doing the latter need not be that of denying the *solus Christus*, but rather of failing to do justice to non-Christian truths and values.”<sup>46</sup> Can, however, Lindbeck have it both ways? Can he coherently describe other communities' truths and realities as “aspects of the coming kingdom” while denying that they are evidence of the “grace of Christ”? On what basis within Christian discourse can a wedge be driven between Christ and the kingdom?

Admittedly, the point is directed polemically against notions such as Rahner's “anonymous Christianity” which Lindbeck regards as an experiential-expressivist appeal to a “preconceptual and prelinguistic experience of salvation”.<sup>47</sup> Nevertheless, his resistance to acknow-

45. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 61. Unfortunately, Lindbeck gives no concrete examples except for an allusion to the process of the Hellenisation of Christianity which, despite its ambiguous results, he judges to have been of “inestimable value” to Christians. One writer who has followed Lindbeck's proposal within the contemporary “other-religions” debate is J. A. DiNoia in his *The Diversity of Religions: A Christian Perspective* (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1992). DiNoia refers to the possibility of Christians being enriched by, for instance, the study of Buddhist methods of meditation and neo-Hindu conceptions of non-violent resistance (93).

46. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 62.

47. Lindbeck, *Nature of Doctrine*, 62.

ledging the grace of Christ at work in other religions reveals how his own *pretheological* model has overwhelmed the desire for theological consistency. The pretheological, cultural-linguistic model with its emphasis on difference, allows a strong commitment to “doing justice to non-Christian truths and values”, yet it is ultimately unable to give a coherent model of the unity of truth without weakening the link between that unity and Christology.

#### 2.4 Summary and Questions

As a challenge to certain regnant models of religion, and as an attempt to encourage Christianity to learn from the rest of the world, Lindbeck’s proposal is admirable. On its own, his cultural-linguistic model establishes grounds for real receptivity to the rest of the world. Nevertheless, that receptivity is strongest only when it reads the world weakly in Christ. If the truths and realities to be known outside the church are not coherently related to the grace of Christ, their claim upon the church is lessened, and interest in them is likely to be dilettante rather than serious. They acquire, therefore, a certain take-it-or-leave-it quality. In the end, his position can best be described in these terms: those who know Christ are on the way to knowing what is ultimately important to know, and if they can be bothered, there are penultimate things to learn along the way.

Highlighting the restrictions which the pretheological cultural-linguistic model brings to Lindbeck’s theological concerns is a recurring theme of his interpreters.<sup>48</sup> For my purposes, however, the most telling is that of Mike Higon who, in a comparison of Lindbeck with Hans Frei (Lindbeck’s erstwhile Yale colleague), concludes that the distinction between their respective projects was that “where Lindbeck had a cultural-linguistic theory, Frei had Christology”.<sup>49</sup> If this is so, does Frei’s work offer what Lindbeck and Justin have both failed to deliver: a coherent and christologically-charged reciprocal engagement with the rest of the world? Or are we forever caught between a defensiveness which is the price of a christologically-strong engagement with the rest

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48. See, for example, Mike Higon, “Frei’s Christology and Lindbeck’s Cultural-Linguistic Theory”, *Scottish Journal of Theology* 50 (1997) 83-95; Robert Gascoine, “The Relation between Text and Experience in Narrative Theology of Revelation”, *Pacifica* 5 (1992) 51-56, especially 54; David H. Kelsey, “Church Discourse and Public Realm”, in Bruce D. Marshall (ed.), *Theology and Dialogue: Essays in Conversation with George Lindbeck* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990) 7-33; John Milbank, *Theology and Political Theory: Beyond Secular Reason* (Oxford: Routledge, 1990) 382-8; Craig Thompson, “George Lindbeck’s ‘The Nature of Doctrine’: Symptom or Cure?” in Geoff Thompson and Christiaan Mostert (eds.), *Karl Barth: A Future for Postmodern Theology?* (Adelaide: Australian Theological Forum, 2000); and John Webster, “Locality and Catholicity: Reflections on Theology and the Church”, *Scottish Journal of Theology* 45 (1992) 1-17.

49. Higon, “Frei’s Christology and Lindbeck’s Cultural-Linguistic Theory”, 95.

of the world and a receptivity which is gained only by weakening the christological character of that engagement?

### 3. THE RECIPROCAL POSTURE: HANS FREI'S "JESUS INCOGNITO"

#### 3.1 The Idea

Frei raises the specific terminology of "Jesus incognito" almost as an aside in a very late text published only posthumously. Nevertheless, it beautifully crystallises the dimension of Frei's thought which is of interest in this study: "I think a Christian case can be made that we have not met the textual Jesus until we have also met him, as Søren Kierkegaard said, in forgetfulness of himself or incognito in a crowd."<sup>50</sup> Three features of this comment are noteworthy. First, it points to the incompleteness of the Christian knowledge of Christ. Second, it refers the Christian to "the crowd" in order to deepen that knowledge. Third, in specifying the Jesus who is to be known as the "textual Jesus", Frei links everything he says about the engagement between the Church and the rest of the world to the fundamental claims of his Christology. Each of these three features is present in his more extended reflections on his theme which are set out in the final chapter of his *The Identity of Jesus Christ*.<sup>51</sup>

This (until recently) relatively little-known work needs to be appreciated as the *theological* companion to Frei's more widely-known *historical* study of modern hermeneutics, *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative*.<sup>52</sup> If the latter work is concerned with literary issues associated in biblical interpretation, the former (infinitely more revealing of Frei's actual theology) is an investigation into the relation between Christ and the believer. This investigation is structured by the categories of "presence" and "identity" (about which more will be said below), and concludes with a discussion of the pattern of Christ's contemporary presence. Despite the profundity and novelty of Frei's engagement with the gospels as he pursues the relationship between presence and identity, there is, at least at first sight, nothing exceptional about the concluding claims which he makes for Christ's contemporary presence. Causing no offence to ecclesiological orthodoxy, he concludes that it is the church which is "the public and communal form the indirect presence of Christ now takes, in contrast to his direct presence in his earthly days".<sup>53</sup> Then, applying a due eschatological reserve, he quickly adds the caveat that this claim could "come dangerously close to

50. Hans W. Frei, *Types of Christian Theology* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992) 136.

51. Hans W. Frei, *The Identity of Jesus Christ: The Hermeneutical Bases of Dogmatic Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975).

52. Hans W. Frei, *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1974).

53. Frei, *Identity*, 157

dissolving the mystery that is the presence of Christ".<sup>54</sup> Consequently, to avoid the exclusivity and arrogance which might gravitate towards this claim, he introduces the category of "witness" to relativise the church: "So it is best to...balance this statement by saying that the church is *simply* the witness to the fact that it is Jesus Christ and none other who is the ultimate presence in and to the world...."<sup>55</sup>

Once again, in all this there appears little that is exceptional. Indeed, Frei had intimated in the book's Preface that his argument ultimately "involves nothing philosophically more high-flown than a doctrine of the Spirit, focused on the Church, the Word, and the Sacraments".<sup>56</sup> Yet in that same context he added that his argument also involved "the conviction of a dread yet hopeful cutting edge and providential pattern to mankind's(*sic*) political odyssey".<sup>57</sup> In fact, it is this "cutting edge" and "providential pattern" which constitutes the real focus of his understanding of the relationship between, on the one hand, the church which witnesses to Christ, and, on the other hand, the world to whom Christ is already present.

As Frei's (admittedly rather brief) statement of the argument unfolds, it becomes clear that the relativising of the church and the affirmation of Christ's presence in the world, leads to a radical – and essential – reciprocity between the church and the world. The human world at large is the "neighbor...to which the church must be open in gratitude without forsaking its own mission and testimony".<sup>58</sup> Moreover, and this is the heart of the issue, "[h]umanity at large is the neighbor *given to* the church, through whom Christ is present *to* the church".<sup>59</sup> The logic of Frei's position is neatly captured by David Demson who writes: "World is ingredient in church, just as church is ingredient in world."<sup>60</sup> Yet, it has also to be said that Frei is even more specific than this. For despite his reference to "humanity at large", what actually enriches the church is not the "world" or "humanity" in some general sense, but "events in the history of mankind at large that may parabolically bespeak the presence of Christ in a far more significant and evident way" than may occur within the church itself.<sup>61</sup> Using the argument of Romans 11 as his warrant, Frei suggests that "the really significant events may well transpire among the "Gentiles" from whom the church ("Israel") receives the enrichment of her humanity".<sup>62</sup>

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54. Frei, *Identity*, 158

55. Frei, *Identity*, 158f. (my emphasis).

56. Frei, *Identity*, ix.

57. Frei, *Identity*, ix.

58. Frei, *Identity*, 160

59. Frei, *Identity*, 162. (my emphases).

60. David E. Demson, *Hans Frei and Karl Barth: Different Ways of Reading Scripture* (Grand Rapids, MI; Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 1997) 45.

61. Frei, *Identity*, 162.

62. Frei, *Identity*, 162.

Such parables are recognised through their conformity to the pattern, salvifically established by Jesus, of sacrifice leading to reconciliation. The few examples which Frei gives are confined to his own context of mid-1970s North America, but nevertheless clearly indicate the direction of his thought. A key passage is worth quoting in full:

Surely the pattern of this agony and hope may be discerned in such instances as a nation of brothers fighting a civil war to purge itself of the curse of slavery and so achieve concretely a union previously little more than a contractual arrangement. One may dimly discern the same pattern in the equally agonized and uncertain fight of the same nation to complete the unfinished task of reconciliation of those who have lived in estrangement from each other because of racial discrimination. Dare we hope that the terrible suffering inflicted on a small East Asian people by the defensive provinciality of a large power may someday in retrospect exhibit the same pattern of reconciliation of extreme opposites, instead of mere aimless and terrible futility?<sup>63</sup>

It is such events which constitute the "hopeful cutting edge" and "providential pattern" to humanity's political odyssey, and thus the events of which the church must take note as it seeks to follow Christ.

Already, I suggest, this line of thought can be seen to be an advance beyond both Justin and Lindbeck.

Although, like Justin, reading the world strongly in Christ, Frei does not repeat Justin's supersessionism, but clearly sees the church's knowledge of Christ as still unfolding. Although, like Lindbeck, seeking to be open to receiving from the world, Frei does not repeat Lindbeck's failure to ground that openness Christologically.

Nevertheless, at this point a critical question must be put to my own interpretation of Frei: how does reading the world so strongly in Christ cohere with genuine reciprocity? In other words, to quote Mike Higton who raises this issue in another context: "[D]oes [Christ's] presence discovered in the world add to Christians' knowledge of the him, or is it simply more of the same, a confirmation of what Christians already know?"<sup>64</sup> If it is the latter, then the claim to genuine reciprocity appears threatened. That threat is resisted, I suggest, on two fronts. The first is that Frei's recognition of Christ-like patterns in the rest of the world is grounded in his "retrieval of classical figural reading",<sup>65</sup> a skill which he can be seen to be extrapolating from written texts to the interpretation of cultural and social events. The second is the full impact of the eschatological reserve with which he qualifies the church as the

63. Frei, *Identity*, 162.

64. M. A. Higton, "'A Carefully Circumscribed Progressive Politics': Hans Frei's Political Theology", *Modern Theology* 15 (1999) 55-83, see p. 75.

65. Higton, "Progressive Politics", 75.

presence of Christ. These two dimensions of Christ's thought will now be examined.

### 3.2 The Influence of Figural Reading

A full account of Frei's understanding of figural reading – a major theme of *The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative* – lies beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, there is one theme of his account of figural reading which has direct bearing on this discussion: the way in which a figure has a reality independent of that which it prefigures. Consider these remarks from *Eclipse*:

In figural interpretation the figure itself is real in its own place, time and right, and without any detraction from that reality it prefigures the reality that will fulfill it. This figural relation not only brings into coherent relation events in biblical narration, but allows also the fitting of each present occurrence and experience into a real, narrative framework or world. Each person, each occurrence is a figure of that providential narrative in which it is also an ingredient.<sup>66</sup>

The key point here is that the figure is not merely superseded by, but is itself an ingredient in, and contributes to the defining and constituting of, that which it prefigures. For Frei, the coherence of figural reading depends on the uniqueness of both the figure and the fulfilment. This conviction undergirds Frei's engagement with the literary phenomenon of "Christ figures" presented in contemporary novels, and his comments in this regard are helpful for grasping the kind of reciprocity at issue.<sup>67</sup> Although he rejects several such fictional characters as legitimate figures of Christ, it is not because they could not be this in principle, but simply because the various authors have not preserved the identity of either the figure or Christ. "If such fiction", he writes,

is to remind us of Jesus and tell us his story over again, it must remind us by some other unique, particular person's or people's identity and story. And to do that means that in the very likeness of the mirrored story to the original, the concrete, specifying *difference* will have to stand out as clearly as the similarity, so that that other person will have his own individuality and not simply echo Jesus.<sup>68</sup>

The same argument applies to actual followers of Christ: they are not called to be clones, but disciples who follow at a distance and make their

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<sup>66</sup> Frei, *Eclipse*, 153.

<sup>67</sup> The novels considered are Herman Melville's *Billy Budd*, Nikos Kazantzakis' *The Last Temptation of Christ* and Graham Greene's *The Power and the Glory*.

<sup>68</sup> Hans Frei, "Theological Reflections on the Accounts of Jesus' Death and Resurrection" in Hans W. Frei, *Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays*, edited by George Hunsinger and William C. Placher (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993)

own footprints behind those of Christ.<sup>69</sup> Frei's insistence on the uniqueness of the figure – fictional or real – is summed up well by John David Dawson: "To rule out fictional representations or followers as 'echoes' of Christ is to protect the unique identity of Christ. But the logic works the other way around as well: the follower's unique identity is also enhanced rather than absorbed and superseded."<sup>70</sup>

It is this same logic which is implicitly at work in Frei's account of the parables of Christ's salvific presence in events in the world at large. Embraced within that logic is a commitment to the preservation of the historical and cultural uniqueness of those events which means that such parables are not "simply more of the same", or a "mere confirmation of what Christians already know". They are *ingredient* in the church's knowledge of Christ. And this is possible in the first place, because the church's knowledge of Christ is incomplete: "we have not met the textual Jesus *until* we have also met him *incognito* in a crowd". Recalling this claim brings me back to the second source of resistance to the threat of incoherence which might otherwise subvert the claim to reciprocity: Frei's eschatological reserve.

### 3.3 The Impact of Frei's Eschatological Reserve

For Frei, a proper Christian eschatology preserves genuine openness to the future and makes genuine, narratable history possible. His is an eschatology which relativises even the event of Jesus Christ:

The past cannot be an absolute clue to the future, if the future is a genuinely open one. Not even the event of Jesus Christ can be such an absolute clue. The providential action of God over and in his creation is not that of a mechanical fate to be read off one occasion. God's work is mysteriously...coexistent with the contingency of events.... There is no scientific rule to describe it and eliminate the need for narration. Nor is there any historicist perspective or universal claim that can eliminate history's narrative form.<sup>71</sup>

For the church, therefore, to know Christ in this time before the last, involves it knowing one whose history is still unfolding. That in itself, of course, does not *necessarily* direct the church beyond itself to participate in that unfolding history. Nor, however, does the mere claim that Christ is present to the world independent of the church's proclamation. The engagement with the world is consolidated by Frei's insistence that history is not "some specialized or hidden portent within public occurrences".<sup>72</sup> Instead, it is public. Once this claim is developed

69. On this, see Frei, *Identity*, 160.

70. John David Dawson, "Figural Reading and the Fashioning of Christian Identity in Boyarin, Auerbach and Frei", *Modern Theology* 14 (1998) 180-96, see p. 192.

71. Frei, *Identity*, 163.

72. Frei, *Identity*, 161.

Christologically, a very particular view of history emerges: "History is public history – the intention-action pattern formed by the interaction of the church with mankind (*sic*) at large; and it is this history which forms the mysterious pattern of meaning to be disclosed by the presence of God in Jesus Christ".<sup>73</sup> The eschatological insistence upon the still unfolding history of Christ, combined with a rejection of a privatising of that history, leads to the requirement that church interact with the world if it is really to know Christ.

### 3.4 The Christological Background<sup>74</sup>

These last observations about public history and the intention-action pattern involved in the church's interaction with the world take us to the final question to be put to Frei: "How is the reciprocity grounded Christologically?" In fact, "intention-action" and "interaction" are terms derived from Frei's Christology. The licence for applying these terms to the church – which is the indirect presence of Jesus – lies in the fact that they are terms and concepts that Frei has used to describe Jesus as he is rendered in the narratives which give an account of his direct presence: "Jesus was constituted by the interaction of his character and circumstances.... So also is the church."<sup>75</sup>

This rather unusual definition of Jesus emerges from the heart of Frei's Christology as it is articulated in *Identity*. As already noted, the goal of that work was to investigate the relationship between Christ and the believer, and to do so through the categories of "presence" and "identity". In fact, popular associations of "presence" with mysticism and ethical indifference lead Frei to define presence in terms of identity. "Christian faith", he writes, "involves a unique affirmation about Jesus Christ, viz., not only that he is the presence of God but also that knowing his identity is identical with having him present or being in his presence."<sup>76</sup> Lest Frei thereby be thought to be reducing presence to a merely cognitive phenomenon, it is important to note that he appeals to what he perceives is the pattern of knowing employed in the New Testament itself, and to the uniqueness of the one who is known. Claiming that "grateful love of God and neighbour is the proper manner of appropriating the presence",<sup>77</sup> he goes on to say that his own nexus

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73. Frei, *Identity*, 161.

74. I will deal relatively briefly here with issues that are treated at much greater length in the above-quoted works on Frei by Higton and Demson as well as in George Hunsinger, "Afterward: Hans Frei as Theologian" in Hans W. Frei, *Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays*, edited by George Hunsinger and William C. Placher (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 233-70 and John Webster, "Response to George Hunsinger", *Modern Theology* 8 (1992) 129-32.

75. Frei, *Identity*, 160.

76. Frei, *Identity*, 6.

77. Frei, *Identity*, 146.

between identity and presence is a “thought movement similar to and reiterative of that of the original authors, in which grateful discipleship and factual acknowledgment seem to have been – mysteriously – one and the same act.”<sup>78</sup>

This strategy assigns singular theological significance to the gospel genre itself. Jesus’ identity is depicted in the gospels’ narration of his life, death and resurrection. Consequently, only by distorting what they are can the gospels be used either as sources for reconstructing a “Jesus of history” or as ciphers for a “universal Christ-figure” who might exist independently of the specific events depicted in these texts. Instead, “What the gospels tell us”, he writes, “is a fruit of the stories themselves.”<sup>79</sup> The task before the theologian is “to observe the story itself – its structure, the shape of its movement and its crucial transitions”.<sup>80</sup> Such observations yield neither a “Christ of faith” nor a “Jesus of history”, but a “textual Jesus”.

Using identity as the overarching tool with which to observe the story, Frei develops a number of subsidiary and *ad hoc* tools more specifically to clarify – but never systematise – these observations. In short, the concept of identity which Frei finds heuristically useful and appropriate for *these* texts is that which locates a person’s identity not in a set of some unchanging inner-intentions (in which, with respect to Jesus, the gospels have minimal interest), but in the combination of the embodied enactment of those intentions and the embodied reactions to the actions of others (in which, with respect to Jesus, the gospels have maximal interest).<sup>81</sup> Consequently, the structure of Jesus’ identity is described in these terms:

The identity of Jesus...is not given simply in his inner intention, in a kind of story behind the story. It is given, rather, in the enactment of his intentions. But even to say that much is not enough. Rather, his identity is given in the mysterious coincidence of his intentional action with circumstances partly initiated by him, partly devolving upon him. The latter kind of occurrence also, in part, shapes his identity within the story.<sup>82</sup>

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78. Frei, *Identity*, 147.

79. Frei, *Identity*, xiv.

80. Frei, *Identity*, 87.

81. In developing this definition Frei draws, strictly in an *ad hoc* manner, on the dictum of Henry James: “What is character but the determination of incident. What is incident but the illustration of character.” See *Identity*, 88.

82. Frei, *Identity*, 94. That is not to say that by incorporating the influence of circumstance into the definition of Identity Frei is abandoning any idea of a subject’s continuity. The concept of continuity is articulated by Frei in his exploration of “subject-manifestation” (126-38).

So defined, the concept of identity enables Frei to trace the plot of the gospel story, and thus the identity of Jesus, in explicitly theological terms as he follows Jesus interacting with humans and with God.

So read, the plot reveals Jesus' identity manifested with increasing clarity in the successive stages of the gospel story, and reaching a climax in the passion/resurrection stage. In the infancy narratives, Jesus is more what others make him as he is portrayed as a representative figure of Israel's past and hopes. In the public ministry, he becomes more a figure in his own right, proclaiming and embodying the Kingdom of God as he heals, teaches and reacts to the crowds and disciples. Yet, even in this stage, precisely in his identification with the Kingdom of God and the ascription to him of various symbolic titles, Jesus is being categorised by something more than himself. It is only in the final stage – the passion and resurrection – that Jesus becomes most clearly manifest. "His actions and the events converging on him", writes Frei, "are not simply representative or symbolical. They are what they are quite unsubstitutably and gain all their significance from being this specific series of linked circumstances and no other."<sup>83</sup> It is in this stage, specifically in his journey to the cross, that Jesus enacts his intention to be obedient to the one he calls "Father" for the good of all. And it is at this point that his enacted intention involves the closest interaction with God: just as Jesus is here most himself, so also God is most active, yet not at all at the expense of Jesus' identity. In raising Jesus from the dead, God alone is active, but it is Jesus who is manifest. In other words, the quest for Jesus' identity, pursued by tracing the plot of the gospel story, "involves an insistence that we can no longer think of God except as we think of Jesus at the same time, nor of Jesus except by reference to God".<sup>84</sup> This approach might use the categories of acts and events instead of the classical category of substance, but the result restates the classical Christological confession of the hypostatic union.<sup>85</sup>

The orthodox result of this idiosyncratic approach is a reminder that the network of ideas in which Frei's understanding of "Jesus incognito" is developed is no bland affirmation of some vague divine presence outside the church. Instead, it is grounded in a theologically rich and innovative account of who Jesus is and how he is known. Therefore, the claim that the church knows Christ only as it interacts with the world at large is a result of the uncontroversial move of extrapolating Christological principles to ecclesiology. In other words, if Jesus in his direct presence was manifest, in part, through his reciprocal engagement with the world, it can be no different for Jesus in his indirect presence, the church.

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83. Frei, *Identity*, 133.

84. Frei, *Identity*, 155.

85. For a more complete and critical discussion of Frei's orthodoxy, see George Hunsinger, "Afterword" and John Webster, "Response" (see n. 74 above).

## 3.5 Summary

Frei shares with Justin a commitment to reading the world strongly in Christ, but unlike Justin, he regards truth from non-Christians as sources of enrichment for the church rather than redundant to the church. On the other hand, Frei shares with Lindbeck a genuine openness to the rest of the world, but unlike Lindbeck he grounds that openness in a strongly christological reading of the world. It is this latter point which also guarantees Frei's advance beyond the take-it-or-leave-it quality that was shown to belong to Lindbeck's receptivity. Thus, Frei's positions can best be described in these terms: those who have come to know Christ have begun to know the one who is ultimately important to know, and only by engaging in the church's reciprocal interaction with the world will they participate in Christ's still unfolding history, and thereby grow in their knowledge of him.

## 4. CONTRIBUTION

The claim that "we have not met the textual Jesus until we have met him incognito in a crowd" has been shown to presuppose a rich tapestry of ideas which taps into some of the church's deepest convictions. What, however, is the value of this approach to contemporary theology? A brief answer to that question might take its point of departure from Mike Higton's summary of his own commentary on the idea of "Jesus incognito": "It is as if Frei is saying that, although we meet Jesus only through his textual depiction, the reading of that text is inseparable from our interaction with the world."<sup>86</sup>

Higton's comments echo some more general observations made (without, incidentally, any reference to Frei) by Rowan Williams: "If... the Bible is itself a history of the *rereading* of texts, our reading of it should be no different."<sup>87</sup> With this historical precedent assumed, Williams issues the more specific challenge:

The "world of scripture" so far from being a clear and readily definable territory, is an historical world in which meanings are discovered and recovered in action and encounter. To challenge the Church to immerse itself in its "text" is to encourage it to engage with a history of such actions and encounters; and in an era after the disappearance of a unitary Christian worldview, this is to engage with those appropriations of biblical narratives on the frontiers of the Church and beyond represented by figures such as Kierkegaard and Jung.<sup>88</sup>

86. Higton, "Progressive Politics", 75-6.

87. Rowan D. Williams, "Postmodern Theology and the Judgment of the World" in Frederic B. Burham (ed.), *Postmodern Theology* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989), 93.

88. Williams, "Postmodern Theology", 93.

I suggest that Frei helps us to see why this historically observable pattern noted by Williams is theologically valid. As such, Frei's theology deserves a place in contemporary theological conversation precisely because that conversation is under pressure either to tighten or to loosen its christological orientation. Confronted with a cultural, political and intellectual diversity which can no longer be hidden, the rest of the world can, on the one hand, become a theologically threatening place. Christology can easily be invoked to cultivate a defensive posture which would insulate the church from any word of address it might hear from beyond its own boundaries, and thereby deny the pattern of scripture's own development. On the other hand, the rest of the world can become a theologically titillating place. Christology can be surrendered for the sake of a receptive posture which forsakes the opportunity of deepening the church's encounter with Christ. Frei's work offers protection from both these risks by demonstrating that the church, and in particular its reading of scripture, is shaped by its encounter with the world even as it ministers to the world, precisely because Jesus himself was shaped by his encounter with the world even as he ministered to it.